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Comment: Bayesian Checking of the
Second Levels of Hierarchical Models
Andrew Gelman
Bayarri and Castellanos (BC) have written an in-
teresting paper discussing two forms of posterior
model check, one based on cross-validation and one
based on replication of new groups in a hierarchical
model. We think both these checks are good ideas
and can become even more effective when under-
stood in the context of posterior predictive checking.
For the purpose of discussion, however, it is most
interesting to focus on the areas where we disagree
with BC:
1. We have a different view of model checking. Rather
than setting the goal of having a fixed probability
of rejecting a true model and a high probability
of rejecting a false model, we recognize ahead of
time that our model is wrong and view model
checking as a way to explore and understand dif-
ferences between model and data.
2. BC focus on p-values and scalar test statistics.
We favor graphical summaries of multivariate test
summaries.
3. For BC, it is important that p-values have a uni-
form distribution (i.e., that they be u-values, in
our terminology) under the assumption that the
null hypothesis is true. For us, it is important
that p-values be interpretable as posterior prob-
abilities comparing replicated to observed data.
4. BC recommend an “empirical Bayes prior p-value”
as being better than the posterior predictive p-
value. In fact, their empirical Bayes prior p-value
is an approximation to a posterior predictive p-
value which was recommended for hierarchical
models in Gelman, Meng and Stern (1996). BC
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miss this connection by not seeing the full gener-
ality of posterior predictive checking.
In our discussion, we go through each of the above
points in turn and conclude with a comment on
the potential importance of theoretical work such as
BC’s on the future development of predictive model
checking.
1. THE GOAL OF MODEL CHECKING:
REJECTING FALSE MODELS, OR
UNDERSTANDING WAYS IN WHICH THE
MODEL DOES NOT FIT DATA
All models are wrong, and the purpose of model
checking (as we see it) is not to reject a model but
rather to understand the ways in which it does not
fit the data. From a Bayesian point of view, the pos-
terior distribution is what is being used to summa-
rize inferences, so this is what we want to check.
The key questions then become: (a) what aspects of
the model should be checked; (b) what replications
should we compare the data to; (c) how to visualize
the model checks, which are typically highly multi-
dimensional; (d) what to make of the results?
In a wide-ranging discussion of a range of differ-
ent methods for Bayesian model checking, BC fo-
cus on the above question (d): in particular, how
can Bayesian hypothesis testing be set up so that
the resulting p-values can used as a model-rejection
rule with specified Type I errors? This question is
sometimes framed as a desire for calibration in p-
values, but ultimately the desire for calibration is
most clearly interpretable within a model-rejection
framework. For example, BC write that some meth-
ods “can result in a severe conservatism incapable
of detecting clearly inappropriate models.” But it is
not at all clear that, just because a model is wrong,
that it is “inappropriate.” If a model predicts repli-
cated data that are just like the observed data in
important ways, it may very well be appropriate for
these purposes. Recall that we have already agreed
that our models are wrong; we would like to mea-
sure appropriateness in a direct way, rather than
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set a rule that even a true model must be declared
“inappropriate” 5% of the time. For example, in the
model considered by BC, we do not see the rationale
for their testing the hypothesis µ = µ0; we would
rather just perform Bayesian inference for µ.
Our concerns are thus a bit different from those
of BC: we are less concerned about the properties of
our procedures in the (relatively uninteresting) case
that the model is true, and more interested in having
the ability to address the misfit of model to data in
direct terms. One reason, perhaps, of the popular-
ity of our posterior predictive approach, in addition
to its Bayesian flavor and ease of implementation,
is the flexibility that allows us to consider compli-
cated test summaries—including plots of the entire
data set, as well as combinations of data and pa-
rameters and combinations of observed and missing
data—thus bringing the power of exploratory data
analysis to the checking of Bayesian models, and
conversely bringing the power of Bayesian inference
to exploratory data analysis.
Some of the difference in focus can be seen by
looking at the graphs in BC—histograms of the null
distributions of p-values, curves of predictive den-
sities of unidimensional test summaries, and a sin-
gle plot of raw data (but with no comparison plots
of replicated data)— and comparing to the graphs
in Gelman (2004) and Gelman et al. (2005), which
show various plots of time series and other multidi-
mensional test summaries.
2. THE STEPS OF BAYESIAN MODEL
CHECKING
BC begin their paper with a useful characteriza-
tion of any checking method as having a diagnostic
statistic, a distribution for the statistic, and a way to
measure conflict with the null distribution. Here we
briefly explain how our own applied model checking
fits into BC’s three-step framework.
Step 1. BC consider a diagnostic statistic T(xobs)
that depends entirely on observed data. In a Bayesian
framework, the diagnostic statistic, or test statistic,
or discrepancy measure can also depend on parame-
ters (Gelman, Meng and Stern, 1996) and on missing
or latent data (Gelman et al., 2005). It can be helpful
to look purely at observed data, but the expanded
formulation can allow us to define test variables that
more directly catch features of substantive interest.
Step 2. We compare the test variable to the predic-
tive distribution of other data sets yrep that could
have arisen from the same model. Formally intro-
ducing the replications yrep is an important step in
the mathematical formulation of Bayesian testing
because it makes explicit the joint model, p(y, yrep, θ).
(Bayarri and Castellanos use the notation x for data,
but we prefer y because we commonly work in the
applied regression framework in which y is modeled
conditional on predictors, x.) Because we are doing
Bayesian inference, we simply use the posterior dis-
tribution, p(yrep|y), which is also called the posterior
predictive distribution because yrep can be viewed as
predictions.
As discussed by Gelman, Meng and Stern (1996),
the prior predictive distribution is also a posterior
predictive distribution but with yrep defined as aris-
ing from new parameters, θrep, drawn from the model.
The choice of prior or posterior distribution—or,
more generally, the choice of what is to be repli-
cated in defining yrep—depends on which aspects
of the model are being checked. In many cases, the
prior distribution is assigned based on convenience
and so there is no particular interest in checking its
fit to the data.
In the context of the paper at hand, which is ex-
plicitly concerned with checking the second level of
a hierarchical model, it makes sense to use an inter-
mediate replication, in which the hyperparameters
η are kept the same but the lower-level parameters θ
are replicated—that is, resampled from the group-
level model. In the notation of BC, the predictive
distribution of interest would be p(θrep, xrep, η|x),
averaging over the posterior distribution p(η|x). This
is a slight departure from BC’s recommendation to
integrate θ. (Actually, we prefer the term “average
over” to “integrate out” since we perform our com-
putations using simulation.) As we discuss in Section
4 below, it turns out this is very close to what BC
call the empirical Bayes prior predictive check.
Step 3. For a one-dimensional test summary, the
discrepancy between model and data can be summa-
rized by a p-value or, often more usefully, by a pre-
dictive confidence interval. (For example, page 366
of Bayesian Data Analysis has an example from an
analysis of elections in which 12.6% of the elections
in the data switched parties, but in replicated data
sets the 95% interval for the proportion of switches
was [13.0%, 14.3%]. In this case, the model clearly
did not fit this aspect of the data, but this differ-
ence of about one percentage point was not of prac-
tical significance.) For higher-dimensional test sum-
maries, graphical summaries would be appropriate—
COMMENT 3
up to and including plots of the entire data set, com-
pared with plots of replicated data. There is some
potential, we believe, to connect classes of models
with classes of graphs to suggest natural and auto-
matic displays of checks for many problems (Gel-
man, 2003, 2004).
As we have already noted, BC focus on p-values,
which can be useful summaries but are no replace-
ment for graphical comparisons of observed and repli-
cated data that can reveal various aspects of model
misfit. We emphasize that any of the methods dis-
cussed in the BC paper can be applied to graphical
checks.
3. p-VALUES AND u-VALUES
Regarding the discussion in Section 3.5 of BC on
p-values, we refer the reader to Section 2.3 of Gel-
man (2003), which distinguishes between Bayesian
p-values—most simply, posterior probability state-
ments of the form Pr(T (yrep) > T (y)|y)—and
u-values—data summaries with a uniform null dis-
tribution. Classical p-values with pivotal test statis-
tics are also u-values, but in the presence of uncer-
tainty about parameters it is not generally possible
for tests to have both properties at once. On the
occasions that we do summarize test statistics us-
ing tail-area probabilities, we prefer the p-value be-
cause it can be directly interpreted as a statement,
conditional on the model, about what might be ex-
pected in future replications. Here we disagree with
BC, who describe the uniform null distribution as
“a very desirable property, namely having the same
interpretation across problems.” It is perhaps a mat-
ter of taste whether to prefer a posterior summary
with a direct probabilistic interpretation or a less-
interpretable statistic that has a uniform distribu-
tion under the null model. We would certainly not
call our p-values uninterpretable: for example, a p-
value of 0.2 means clearly that, under the model,
20% of future data will be at least as extreme as the
observed data. No calibration is necessary for this
interpretation to be valid.
In any case, our point here is to distinguish be-
tween the two goals—a direct probability statement
and a uniform null distribution—and to point out
that, in general, you cannot have both, just as, in
general, posterior means will not be unbiased es-
timates and posterior intervals will not have clas-
sical confidence coverage for all parameter values.
Ultimately we will evaluate our Bayesian model-
checking methods based on how well they help us
understand differences between model and data, not
based on theoretical coverage properties and not
based on their rates of rejecting models which we
know are false anyway.
4. THE “EMPIRICAL BAYES PRIOR
p-VALUE”
BC’s paper concludes with a statement that em-
pirical Bayes prior p-values “have better properties
[than posterior p-values] and are easier to compute.”
In fact, these EB-prior p-values are very close to pos-
terior p-values, replicating θ but leaving the hyper-
parameters (η, in BC’s notation) fixed, a strategy
which Gelman, Meng and Stern (1996) recommend
for hierarchical models (Figure 1c on page 739 of
that paper). The only difference between the EB-
prior distribution and this posterior predictive dis-
tribution is that the former uses point estimates of
the hyperparameters, which cannot in general be a
good idea (consider, e.g., settings where no good
point estimates exist, such as the 8-schools example
from Chapter 5 of Bayesian Data Analysis). We sus-
pect the good performance of the EB-prior p-values
comes from the appropriate choice of replication for
testing the second level of a hierarchical model—the
same hyperparameters but new groups—not from
the use of point estimates.
To put it another way, take BC’s “empirical Bayes”
method, average over the hyperparameters so that
it becomes “hierarchical Bayes” (as is appropriate
given the other parts of the paper), and you get a
posterior predictive check. We suppose that BC did
not notice this because of their assumption that in
posterior predictive checking, all parameters had to
be kept the same in replications (as in Figure 1a on
page 739 of Gelman, Meng and Stern, 1996). In fact,
the flexibility of predictive checking allows different
aspects of the data and parameter vectors to be pre-
served in replications, and for the particular goal of
BC’s paper, it makes sense to replicate the param-
eters θ (as BC ended up discovering in their sim-
ulations). Sinharay and Stern (2003) discuss these
issues further in the context of the hierarchical nor-
mal model.
5. LOOKING FORWARD
As indicated by the plethora of methods discussed
by BC, there are many ways of combining ideas of
replication and cross-validation. A parallel situation
arises in the literature of the bootstrap (Efron and
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Tibshirani, 1993), with parametric bootstraps, non-
parametric bootstraps, and special methods for spa-
tial and time-series data. A lot more work needs to
be done. In particular, although we do find the pos-
terior predictive framework useful, we recognize that
there is something particularly compelling about ex-
ternal validation and cross-validation. At the theo-
retical level, there is an opening to incorporate vali-
dation into hierarchical modeling with the possibil-
ities of different levels of cross-validation for indi-
viduals and groups (e.g., fivefold cross-validation of
groups and tenfold cross-validation of observations
within groups). More practical concerns include de-
cisions about how to set up the tuning parame-
ters for cross-validation and, when comparisons are
made graphically, how to visualize the many repli-
cated data sets. BC’s partial posterior predictive dis-
tribution could be an excellent way to unify this
area.
The BC paper focuses on p-values, but if our own
experience is any guide, we expect the most use-
ful work to focus on graphical explorations of re-
alized and replicated data. We focused on p-values
in our 1996 paper, but in the years since, we have
found graphical checks to be more helpful, with nu-
merical summaries and p-values coming in at the
end to give some structure to our visual judgments.
The theoretical structure used by BC, of looking at
null distributions of p-values, could become help-
ful here, and also for concerns of multiple compar-
isons.
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